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Abstract: This paper reviews notions related to focus and presupposition and addresses
the hypothesis that focus triggers an existential presupposition. Presupposition projection
behavior in certain examples appears to favor a presuppositional analysis of focus. It is
argued that these examples are open to a different analysis using givenness theory. Overall,
the analysis favors a weak semantics for focus not including an existential presupposition.
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1. Introduction
In my contribution to this volume of papers on notions of information
structure, I will present notions related to focus and presupposition by
working through a single theoretical argument, and defining the notions
which are appealed to as I go. The argument I want to go through
has to do with the possibility of sentences with intonational focus, such
as sentence (1), introducing an existential presupposition. More specifi-
cally, it is about the claim that presupposition transformation behavior
provides an argument that focus can contribute an existential presuppo-
sition (Geurts–van der Sandt 2004; Abusch 2005).
(1) LanaF ate the leftovers.
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The notation F represents a focus feature, as introduced in Jackendoff
(1972). The feature is formally a syntactic one, but it functions mainly
to link the phonology of focus which is a pitch accent or other kind of
phonological prominence, with the semantics and pragmatics of focus.
Three options for the semantics of focus have particular prominence in
current theoretical discussion. According to alternative semantics (Rooth
1985), focus in (1) introduces a set of “alternative” propositions which are
obtained by making substitutions in the position of the focused phrase:
(2) Alternative set (a set of propositions)
{[Lana ate the leftovers], [Mona ate the leftovers], [Nina ate the leftovers],
[Orna ate the leftovers], . . . }
In this paper, I will use the corner brackets seen in (2) as a notation for
naming propositions. In a semantics where sentences denote propositions,
sentence (1) denotes the proposition [Lana ate the leftovers]. According
to alternative semantics, it also contributes the alternative set (2).
The second theory of focus semantics I want to talk about is a pre-
suppositional one, where it is claimed that sentence (1) presupposes that
someone ate the leftovers (Geurts–van der Sandt 2004). We obtain the
effect of existentially quantifying the focused position by forming the dis-
junction of all the propositions in the alternative set, as shown in (3).
The resulting proposition is called the focus closure of example (1). The
disjunction is true if and only if one of the disjuncts is true, so the focus
closure is the proposition (4).
(3) ‘Lana ate the leftovers’ ∨ ‘Mona ate the leftovers’ ∨ ‘Nina ate the leftovers’ ∨
‘Orna ate the leftovers’ ∨ [. . .]
(4) ‘someone ate the leftovers’
(5) gives the general definition of focus closure, using the notation ∪C
for the disjunction (possibly an infinite disjunction) of the propositions
in a set C.
(5) Focus closure
∪C, where C is the alternative set associated with the focus
So, the presuppositional semantics for focus maintains that the focus
closure is presupposed. Another theory of focus semantics that uses the
focus closure is the givenness semantics (Schwarzschild 1999). This is
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the third theory of focus which I discuss in this paper. It is introduced
in section 4.
2. Compositional tests for presupposition
What is meant by “presupposed”? Assumptions about presupposition
have a semantic and a pragmatic part. According to compositional se-
mantic theories of presupposition, the information contributed by a sen-
tence can be viewed as packaged into two parts, a presupposed propo-
sition and an asserted proposition. For sentence (6), the presupposed
proposition is that John has some cars, and the asserted proposition is
that the transmission on any car which John has is a manual transmis-
sion. The latter is stated in such a cumbersome way because one wants
to avoid describing the asserted proposition using a sentence which itself
has presuppositions.
(6) John’s cars have manual transmissions. (ϕ in the next example)
(7) pres(ϕ) = [John has some cars]
ass(ϕ) = [any car that John has has a manual transmission]
An argument for the division into presupposition and assertion is that the
presupposed and asserted parts are treated differently by compositional
semantic rules. For instance, when a sentence is negated, the assertion is
semantically negated, but the presupposed part is preserved. As shown
in (8), the negation of sentence (6) still has the implication that John
has some cars.
(8) John’s cars don’t have manual transmissions.
pres(¬ϕ) = [John has some cars]
Compositional contexts where presuppositions are preserved are known
as presupposition holes (Karttunen 1973). Another hole is the if -clause
of a conditional, as exemplified in (9). The complex sentence (9), which
has the form if ϕ ψ, has the implication that John has some cars, indi-
cating that the presupposition of the if -clause ϕ has been inherited by
the complex sentence.
(9) If John’s cars have manual transmissions, I don’t want to borrow one.
presupposition: John has some cars.
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Together, the collection of presupposition hole contexts is the “family” of
hole contexts. These hole contexts are used as a test for presuppositions.
If one has a sentence ϕ which has an implication ϕ′, and one wants to
find out if ϕ′ is a presupposition, one plugs ϕ into a hole context in a
complex sentence, and checks whether the implication ϕ’ is inherited by
the complex sentence. If it is, this is indicative of a presuppositional
status of ϕ′.
As an illustration, let us apply the test to sentence (6). We start
with the intuition that (6) implies that John has some cars. To test for
presuppositional status, we check implications of the negated sentence
(8), and the if -sentence (9). Intuitively, both imply that John has some
cars. This is considered evidence that the implication of the original
sentence that John has some cars is presuppositional. The negation part
of this procedure is known as the negation test for presuppositional status
of an implication. The whole thing is known as the “family of sentences”
test, referring to the family of presupposition holes.
To apply the negation test to the focus example (1), we start with
the observation that (1) implies that someone ate the leftovers. Then we
check whether the negation of (1), which is (10), also has that implication.
There is an intuition that it does, in that someone who used (10) would
normally intend to convey that someone other than Lana had eaten the
leftovers.
(10) LanaF didn’t eat the leftovers.
In (11), the if -hole context is applied to (6). Intuitively, the if -sentence
implies that John has some cars. This again counts as evidence that (6)
presupposes that John has some cars.
(11) If John’s cars have manual transmissions, he must be a handy person.
In example (12), the if -hole test is applied to the focus sentence (1).
Intuitively, the if -sentence implies that someone ate the leftovers. This
is evidence that sentence (1) has an existential presupposition.
(12) If LanaF ate the leftovers, that would explain why she is nauseous.
I should point out that the intuition that (12) implies that someone ate
the leftovers is unstable. It is possible to make the existential implication
go away by adding more context, as in (13).
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(13) A: Did anyone finish the leftovers?
B: I don’t know. If LanaF ate the leftovers, that would explain why she is
nauseous.
There are other families of contexts where presuppositions are trans-
formed in particular ways. In the conditional family, the presupposition
of ϕ in a complex sentence which has sub-sentences ψ and ϕ is compo-
sitionally weakened to ass(ψ)→ pres(ϕ). An example of the conditional
context for ϕ is the negated main clause of a conditional, where the
if -clause is ψ. Consider sentence (14a). Intuitively, it implies that if
the sample was analyzed, then it was tested for polonium. (This might
be true because of the circumstances of a certain police investigation.)
The if -sentence (14a) with its negated main clause has the constituents
shown in (14b). Sentence ϕ intuitively has the implication that someone
tested the sample for polonium. This is the ϕ′ which is being tested for
presuppositional status.
To complete the test, we check our intuitions about whether the
complex sentence has the implication (14c). It does, so this is evidence
of ϕ′ being a presupposition of ϕ.
(a)(14) If the sample was analyzed, it wasn’t Trevor who tested it for polonium.
(b) ψ [the sample was analyzed]
ϕ [it was Trevor who tested it for polonium]
ϕ′ someone tested the sample for polonium
(c) ass(ψ) → ϕ′
If the sample was analyzed, someone tested the sample for polonium.
Notice that it is the combination of the if -construction and the main
clause negation which is being used as the test context. More precisely,
since we want to indicate the position of both ψ and ϕ, the context is if
ψ not ϕ. Why not use the simpler if ψ ϕ? This is tried out in (15).
(a)(15) If the sample was analyzed, it was Trevor who tested it for polonium.
(b) ψ [the sample was analyzed]
ϕ [it was Trevor who tested it for polonium]
ϕ′ someone tested the sample for polonium
(c) ass(ψ) → ϕ′
If the sample was analyzed, someone tested the sample for polonium.
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 55, 2008
324 DORIT ABUSCH
The constituent ϕ has the implication ϕ′, which we want to test for
presuppositional status. Intuitively, the complex sentence (15a) has the
implication (15c). Is this evidence for presuppositional status of ϕ′?
It isn’t, because in the context if ψ ϕ, assertions of ϕ are transformed
in the same way. This is illustrated in (16). The main clause ϕ has the
implication ϕ′, which is in fact an entailment of ass(ϕ). The complex
sentence (16a) intuitively has the implication ass(ψ)→ ϕ′. This shouldn’t
lead us to the incorrect conclusion that ϕ′ is a presupposition of ϕ.
(a)(16) If the sample was analyzed, Trevor tested it for polonium.
(b) ψ [the sample was analyzed]
ϕ [Trevor tested the sample for polonium]
ϕ′ someone tested the sample for polonium
(c) ass(ψ) → ϕ′
If the sample was analyzed, someone tested the sample for polonium.
This example shows that an adequate compositional test for presupposi-
tion involves a context where presuppositions are transformed in certain
characteristic ways which are distinct from the way that assertions are
compositionally transformed. If we nevertheless want to make an argu-
ment based on (15), we need to argue in an independent way that the
implication ass(ψ) → ϕ′ of the complex sentence is a presupposition.
Now I would like to apply the context if ψ not ϕ to test for a focus
existential presupposition in the focus sentence (17a). Notice that this
is a pure-focus version of the cleft sentence (17b) which we worked with
above. So the logic will be parallel.
(a)(17) TrevorF tested the sample for polonium.
(b) It was Trevor who tested the sample for polonium.
The test sentence is (18).
(18) If the sample was analyzed, TrevorF didn’t test it for polonium.
The breakdown into constituents, which is given in (19), is parallel to
(14b). We start with the intuition that the constituent ϕ has an impli-
cation ϕ′ that someone tested the sample for polonium, and want to test
whether this implication is a presupposition.
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(19) ψ [the sample was analyzed]
ϕ [TrevorF tested it for polonium]
ϕ′ someone tested the sample for polonium
In checking intuitions about (18), we should allow for a variety of in-
tonational patterns which include a lot of prominence on Trevor. This
is because we want to consider representations where Trevor is focused,
but aren’t sure what the optimal intonation pattern is for the sentence
as a whole. For instance, in a very natural pronunciation of the cleft
sentence (15a), there is prominence on polonium. So we should consider
pronunciations of (18) where there is prominence on polonium, together
with prominence on Trevor.
In fact, there is reason to suspect that a B accent or topic accent
would fit into this context (Jackendoff 1972; Büring 1997). A context
which triggers topic accents is shown in (20). A background multiple-
wh question is broken down into sub-questions. The sub-question who
tested it for polonium triggers in the answer a focus accent on Trevor,
and a topic accent on polonium. Topic accent is arguably a sub-species
of focus accent.
(20) (Who tested it for what radioactive element? . . .
Who tested it for radium? . . .
What about polonium? Who tested it for that?)
TrevorF tested it for poloniumT.
Since sentence (18) can suggest that a number of tests were performed,
there might be an implicit topic ‘who tested the sample for polonium’
which would trigger the focus/topic intonation pattern. In fact this pat-
tern works very well in the positive version (21) of (18). Introspectively,
the topic accent can be perceived as a “rising” accent, in contrast to a
“falling” focus accent.
(21) If the sample was analyzed, TrevorF tested it for poloniumT.
What are the results of this experiment? I have a hard time finding the
intuition that any pronunciation of (18) with a focus accent on Trevor,
or any specific semantic or pragmatic reading of such a pronunciation of
(18), really presupposes that if the sample was analyzed, then someone
tested it for polonium. I have the intuition that sentence (18), with focus
on Trevor, leaves open the possibility that a test of the sample might not
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have included a test for polonium. This contrasts strongly with the cleft
version (14a). If this intuition is correct, it indicates that focus does not
trigger an existential presupposition.
What about (21)? I think that someone who used this sentence
could naturally be understood to be taking for granted that if the sample
was analyzed, someone tested it for polonium. This notion of “taking for
granted” is our next topic. But for the reason discussed above, this exam-
ple is not a clear argument for focus existential presupposition, because
in the context with an un-negated main clause, assertions are composi-
tionally transformed in the same way as presuppositions.
3. Common ground pragmatics for presupposition
So far, in trying to identify presuppositions of sentences and in testing
whether focus triggers a presupposition, we have just been checking in-
tuitions about “implications” of sentences. The asserted component of
meaning is also an implication of a sentence. We can imagine a lan-
guage similar to English where presuppositions are components of mean-
ing which have a special system of compositional semantics, but which
at the end have exactly the same pragmatic status as assertions. This
language would differ from English not in compositional semantics, but
in the pragmatic interpretation of the semantic objects which composi-
tional semantics provides. In this language, the compositional phenom-
ena themselves would be the only motivation for the distinction between
presupposition and assertion. Arguably these compositional phenomena
are systematic enough to motivate the distinction by themselves.
In the real English, the pragmatic interpretation of presuppositions
is not equivalent to the pragmatic interpretation of assertions. There are
unstable intuitions that presuppositions are somehow “taken for granted,”
things the speaker presents as being already known by the hearer. There
is an idealized theory which brings out this intuition. In a conversation
where two speakers are exchanging information cooperatively, a common
store of shared information builds up. It consists of things the speak-
ers have agreed about. At any point in the conversation, we can check
whether a given proposition follows from the current store of common
information, which is called a common ground (Stalnaker 1974). This
is the pragmatic interpretation of presupposition: using a sentence ϕ is
appropriate only if the current store of shared information entails pres(ϕ).
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In real conversations, the common-ground constraint is often not
observed. Suppose we don’t know each other very well at all. After a
talk, I tell you (22). By compositional criteria, that I have a BlackBerry
is a presupposition of the second sentence in (22). According to the
constraint, I should use the sentence only if it follows from our store of
common information that I have a BlackBerry. In fact, before hearing
(22) you knew nothing about it, and you are surprised to learn that I
have one, since I am a linguist rather than a rapper or a businessman.
However, my utterance is not at all perceived as inappropriate.
(22) I can’t contact Mark about the dinner arrangements right now. My BlackBerry
is out of range.
As it is used in theoretical arguments, the common-ground pragmatics
for presupposition can be taken as an idealized theory which is useful
in theorists’ armchair experiments. In arguing that an implication is a
presupposition, theorists refer to intuitions about the implication tending
to be taken for granted, in addition to applying the compositional tests
I discussed above. There are attempts at constructing a more realistic
theory building on the common ground pragmatics in Stalnaker (2002)
and von Fintel (2006).
4. Another analysis of the conditional presupposition
Above I said that there was an intuition that (21) has a conditional
presupposition. The evidence is contradictory, because the negated con-
ditional (18) was evidence against the hypothesis that focus triggered a
presupposition.
In Abusch (2005), I used data similar to (21) as part of an argument
for a pragmatic mechanism which optionally generates an existential pre-
supposition for focus. (23) was my example. Intuitively, focus here is
supported by the assumption that the Trust Company keeps all its valu-
ables in the vault, so that if Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company,
then someone opened the vault. This is the conditional presupposition
we experience. I treated this as evidence for a focus presupposition, in
partial agreement with Guerts and van der Sandt (2004).
(23) If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then sheF opened the vault.
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Now I am going to question this argument by looking at another exam-
ple where a conditional presupposition is observed with focus. In (24),
intuitively the focus is licensed by the same conditional assumption we
saw before, namely that if Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company
then someone opened the vault.
(24) Abner and Lana shouldn’t rob the Trust Company if youF already opened the
vault.
Unlike before, in this example the focus is not in a position where an
existential presupposition would be locally satisfied. The focus is in the
if -clause of a conditional, and the antecedent for the focus is in the pre-
ceding main clause. Before, in the discussion related to (14), we saw that
the main clause of an if -sentence is in the conditional family of presuppo-
sition transformers. But the if -clause itself is in the hole family, meaning
that presuppositions of the if -clause project. This is illustrated in (11).
This sentence has an initial if -clause, but the situation is the same for
a version with a final if -clause as in (25). So, a presupposition in an
if -clause is not compositionally transformed. Even if focus triggered an
existential presupposition, that would not explain our intuitions about
(24), because a presupposition pres(ϕ) of ϕ in the context ψ if ϕ is not
transformed to ass(ψ) → pres(ϕ).
(25) John must be a handy person if his cars have manual transmissions.
A minimal contrast with focus is provided by the it-cleft. In (26), a
cleft is substituted for focus in (24). In this sentence, the cleft presup-
position in the if -clause is not satisfied by the information in the main
clause, in contrast with the situation for focus in (24). It is in fact hard
to contextualize or make sense of sentence (26), while it is possible to
contextualize (24).
(26) Abner and Lana shouldn’t rob the Trust Company if it is youF who (already)
opened the vault.
Where does this leave us? A conditional presupposition is observed in
(24). But it is not possible to attribute this to compositional transfor-
mation of an existential presupposition associated with the focus. This
is indicated both by the contrast with (26), and by the fact that theories
of presupposition projection do not predict conditional transformation of
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presuppositions in this context. So the conditional presupposition we see
in (24) must have some other source.
In fact it is no mystery what this source is. Lakoff (1971) pointed
out that focus can be licensed via an entailment relation. A pure example
of this is (27), which exploits the fact that the first clause entails that
John moved the vase. This entailment relation results from the lexical
and compositional semantics of the predicates carry upstairs and move.
Lakoff pointed out that examples like (28) exploit contextual assump-
tions, here the assumption (a controversial one) that calling someone a
Republican entails insulting them.
(27) First John carried the vase upstairs, then MaryF moved it.
(28) First John called Mary a Republican, then sheF insulted himF.
Entailment was built into a theory of focus semantics by Schwarzschild
(1999) in his givenness semantics for focus. Restricting attention to a
special case of his licensing condition, focus is licensed if there is an
antecedent in the discourse which entails the focus closure. In (27) the
focus closure is [someone moved the vase], which is entailed by the first
clause in (27), so the focus is licensed. The same story applies in (28),
except that one must allow contextual assumptions to be used in checking
entailment.
Now let us apply an analysis using givenness licensing to the focus
example (23), using the if -clause as the antecedent in givenness licensing
of focus. The focus constraint is that contextual assumptions together
with the antecedent ‘Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company’ entail
that someone opened the vault. Equivalently, it must follow from the
auxiliary assumptions that if Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Com-
pany, then someone opened the vault. This is exactly the conditional
presupposition we experience. The entailment presupposition is now be-
ing derived directly in focus theory, rather than in a compositional ac-
count of presupposition. An advantage of this is that the analysis carries
over to examples like (26) which are not in the conditional family of
presupposition transformers.
The conclusion of this argument is that we should not consider ex-
ample (23) evidence for a focus existential presupposition, because it can
be given a different analysis. And overall, the data discussed in this pa-
per favor a weak semantics for focus, not including anything as strong
as an existential presupposition.
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